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EU Enlargement and Ireland’s Labour Market
*
 
Ireland, along with Sweden and the UK, allowed full access to its labour market to the 
citizens of the accession countries when the EU enlarged in May 2004. Given the limited 
number of countries that opened up and the rapid pace of economic growth in Ireland around 
2004, a significant inflow was expected. However, the rate of inflow exceeded all 
expectations. Based on census information, the number of EU10 nationals living in Ireland 
grew from around 10,000 in 2002 to 120,000 in 2006. Data on inflows suggests that this 
number could have reached 200,000 by 2008 or 4.5 percent of the population. The EU10 
immigrants have very high employment rates and also have levels of education that are 
comparable to the native labour force in Ireland. However, they appear to earn considerably 
less than the native labour force and also to be in lower grade occupations. They have 
impacted positively on the Irish economy in terms of GNP growth. This is because wages 
grew more slowing in Ireland than would otherwise have been the case as a result of the 
labour supply increase brought about by this immigration flow. 
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EU Enlargement and Ireland’s Labour Market 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
The last ten years have seen extraordinary growth in the Irish economy. The 
unprecedented period of growth lead to many changes in Ireland’s economy and 
society. Among the most significant of these changes was the reversal of years of 
migratory outflows and the inflow of large numbers of immigrants. These inflows 
began around the mid-1990s but accelerated dramatically after EU enlargement. 
Given the speed with which the economy was growing around 2004, the Government 
decided to allow full access to the Irish labour market to all citizens of the European 
Union’s New Member States (EU10) from the date of accession, i.e. 1 May 2004
2. In 
making this decision, they were joined by the governments of Sweden and the UK 
only. This gave rise to a situation in which potential migrants from the EU10 had a 
limited number of destinations from which to choose if they wanted to work legally. 
With Ireland growing so strongly around 2004, it was perhaps inevitable that a large 
inflow from the EU10 would result.  
 
In this chapter, we will explore the size, nature and impacts of this migratory inflow 
from the EU10 to Ireland. In Section 2, we present figures on the size of the inflow, 
relative to the population and to the labour force. In Section 3, we look at the inflow 
in greater detail and review what recent research tells us about the characteristics and 
experiences of EU10 immigrants in Ireland, with a particular emphasis on the labour 
market. In Section 4, we move to the issue of impact and present estimates of the 
impact of EU10 immigration. In Section 5, we draw the various strands together and 
discuss how the migration of people from the EU10/12 to Ireland may have differed 
from other flows, largely based on our perception that the inflow had a temporary 
dimension. 
 
Section 2: The Size of the Inflow 
                                                 
2 The same freedoms were not extended to Romanian and Bulgarian citizens when their countries 
joined the EU. As a result, most of the discussion in this chapter refers to immigrants from the EU10 
only. On occasions, we do make reference to immigrants from the EU12 because official data is 
sometimes published on that basis. The precise group to which we are referring is specified where 
relevant throughout the text although the difference in numbers between EU10 and EU12 is slight.   2
 
It is important to set this discussion of migration into Ireland in the broader context of 
macro-economic developments. For this reason, we begin this section by looking at 
Ireland’s growth performance since 1990, at levels of employment and also at rates of 
unemployment. In Figure 1, we show growth rates of real GNP and the exceptional 
performance of the Irish economy is clear. Over this period, growth rates averaged 5.7 
percent, thereby earning Ireland what is now the familiar label of the “Celtic Tiger”. 
What is of more relevance for current purposes is the growth performance in the 
period around EU Accession. Like many countries, Ireland experience a dip around 
2001/2. However, the economy soon bounced back and recorded average growth rates 
of just over 5 percent between 2003 and 2007.  
 
We can get another view of the extraordinary growth performance by looking at 
changes in the level of employment over the same time period. In 1990, there were 
1.16 million people working in Ireland. By 2007, this number had risen to 2.1 million, 
an increase of 80 percent. Within the period 2003 to 2007 alone, employment grew 
from 1.79 million to 2.1 million, an increase of almost 17 percent. As a final element 
in this macro-overview, we consider the rate of unemployment. The rate peaked at 
almost 16 percent in 1993 before beginning a downward slide through to 2001. In that 
year, the rate fell to below 3.7 percent. The rate did rise again after 2001 but remained 
low by contemporaneous European standards and only reached 4.5 percent in 2007.  
 
We turn now to consider migration but continue to provide a longer historic picture by 
way of providing context for the later discussion of migration in the period after 2004. 
In Figure 2 we show net inflows into Ireland over the period 1987 to 2007. We have 
decided to include some years from the late 1980s because in so doing we can capture 
that fact that as recently as then, Ireland was experiencing large population outflows. 
Between 1987 and 1990, the net outflow totalled 131,000 – as the population in 1991 
was just 3.5 million, that net outflow was around 4 percent of the population and 
came on top of an additional net outflow of some 70,000 in the earlier part of the 
1980s. 
 
Even though the economy began to grow rapidly in 1994, it was not until 1997 that 
significant net inflows emerged. In that year, the net inflow was 19,200. In general,   3
the net inflow increased up to 2001 when it reached 41,300. However, even this figure 
was to be somewhat eclipsed following EU Accession. The net inflow averaged 
almost 65,000 in the three years between 2005 and 2007.  
 
Having looked at the economy and migration in broad terms, we now want to look in 
greater detail at the period 2004 to 2007 and in particular at the inflow of EU10 
nationals. Our first task is to get a sense of the size of the EU10 inflow, both relative 
to the population in general and also relative to other immigrant groups. We begin by 
looking at measures of stocks in the Census’ of 2002 and 2006. We also look at 
information on flows, as further insights can be obtained from them. 
 
In Table 1, we show how the population of Ireland grew from 3,858,495 in 2002 to 
4,172,013 in 2006, an increase of over 300,000 or 8 percent. We also see that the 
population of non-Irish people living in Ireland grew from 224,261 in 2002 to 
419,733. This was an increase of almost 200,000 and so we can say that almost two 
thirds of Ireland’s population increase between 2002 and 2006 was driven by the 
inward migration of non-nationals. If we include those who failed to provide a 
nationality in the Census questionnaires in the group of non-nationals, we see that the 
non-national proportion of Ireland’s population grew from 7 percent in 2002 to 11 
percent in 2006. We can put this rate of growth in context by noting that the 
immigrant share of the UK population grew by 2 percentage points over the thirty-
year period, 1960-1990 (Bell, 1997). Over the same period, the immigrant share in the 
US grew by 2.5 percentage points (again, Bell, 1997). Set in this context, the four 
percentage point increase in the share of immigrants in Ireland’s population over a 
four year period is quite remarkable. 
 
Turning to the immigrants from the EU10, it is not possible to an exact figure for their 
stocks in 2002 based on published data but it is possible to infer an upper bound 
figure. As shown in Table 1, we know that there were 23,105 immigrants from non-
EU European countries living in Ireland in 2002. We also know that 9,101 were from 
Russia, Romania and the Ukraine. Hence, a maximum of 14,000 were from what we 
now refer to as the EU10. For 2006, we do have exact figures on the number of 
immigrants from the EU10. The total was 120,534, including 63,276 Poles, 24,628   4
Lithuanians and 13,319 Latvians. This numbers imply that between 2002 and 2006, 
the stock of immigrants from the EU10 in Ireland grew by over 100,000. 
 
In order to get a sense of the size of the continuing flow after the Census in April 
2006, we can look at figures from the Central Statistics Office. In Table 2, we present 
CSO information on flows into Ireland between 2003 and 2008. In the years before 
2004, immigrants from the EU12 were included in the “rest of world” category. 
However, for 2005 onwards, they are separately identified and a continuing strong 
inflow after 2006 is clear. In the two years ending April 2008, 86,400 immigrants 
from the EU12 settled in Ireland. While there was also an outflow to these countries 
of 16,000, the net inflow of 70,000 between 2006 and 2008 suggests that the 
population of EU12 immigrants would have been around 200,000 by April 2008. As 
the total population was estimated to be 4.42 million in 2008, this implies that 
immigrants from the EU 12 made up 4.5 percent of the total population. If we recall 
that there proportion in 2002 was less than 0.5 percent, the size of the inflow relative 
to the existing population is clear. 
 
As a final view on the size of the inflow of EU12 immigrants into Ireland after 
accession, we can look at administrative records and, in particular, the issuing of 
social security numbers (known as PPS numbers in Ireland). We do this because a 
very different impression of the size of the inflow is generated if we take this 
perspective and so it is useful to explore the discrepancy between the data just 
presented and the administrative data. 
 
In Table 3, we present data on the numbers of PPS numbers issued to EU 10 nationals 
between 2002 and 2006. It should be recalled from above that our comparison of the 
stocks of EU 10 nationals in the Census’ of 2002 and 2006 suggested that the net 
inflow was in the order to 100,000. However, we can see from Table 3 that well over 
300,000 PPS numbers were issued to EU10 national over this period. Even allowing 
for the fact that the 2006 Census was in April and so many of the PPS numbers issued 
in 2006 would have been to people arriving after April, there is a huge discrepancy 
between the Census/labour force survey data and the administrative data. However, a 
clue to the reason underlying the discrepancy is included in the administrative data 
and is shown in Table 3.   5
 
The first column in Table 3 after the “allocation” column shows the proportion of PPS 
numbers issued for which no employment activity was recorded. Taking 2005 as an 
example, we see that of the 107,000 numbers issued, almost 20 percent were issued to 
people who did not subsequently show up as working. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this. First, the individuals could have worked in situations where they 
avoided tax. Second, the individuals could have looked for work in Ireland but may 
have moved on to the UK or back home without having worked here. A third 
possibility is that people applied for PPS numbers but without any intention of 
working, although this is probably the least likely. As the Irish Government imposed a 
two-year residency requirement in order to be eligible for welfare payments, there 
would be little point in EU 10 immigrants applying for PPS numbers unless they did 
intend working.  
 
The last four columns of Table 3 show the proportion of PPS numbers issued in each 
year that were “active” across years, where “active” refers to some level of work 
being recorded. Taking 2005 again as an example, we can see that 69 percent of PPS 
numbers were still active in 2006, implying that 31 percent of those receiving 
numbers in 2005 were not working (legally at least) in 2006 and so may have left 
Ireland. For 2004, a similar picture emerges.  
 
While the administrative data suggest a much bigger inflow into Ireland relative to the 
Census/labour force survey data, they also point to a short-term dimension in some of 
the migratory moves. This is an important point because it is likely to have 
implications which may not be captured in the way we model the impacts of 
immigration. As discussed in Section 4 below, the impact of immigration in Ireland 
has been estimated by using a statistically generated model of the labour market and 
by conducting simulations. If this large and temporary inflow of labour has altered the 
way in which the labour market functions, then the modelling approach might miss 
this.  
 
Section 3: The Characteristics and Experiences of the Inflow 
   6
Having looked at the size of the EU12 immigrant inflow in broad terms, we now turn 
to look at the labour market dimensions in a more focussed way. We firstly want to 
discuss the labour-related characteristics of EU12 immigrants. We then want to look 
at the labour market experiences of these immigrants, in terms of their earnings and 
occupational attainment. In this section, we will draw on existing research and we will 
begin with the most up-to-date data published by the CSO. 
 
In Table 4, we show the numbers employed, unemployed and inactive in Ireland by 
national groups and also the unemployment and employment rates for 2008. The first 
point to be taken from the table is the size of the EU12 group as a proportion of 
Ireland’s labour force. There are 178,800 EU 12 immigrants in Ireland’s labour force, 
which amounts of 8 percent of the total of 2,223,900. We estimated above that the EU 
made up about 4.5 percent of the population so the 8 percent points to a significant 
over-representation in the labour force. The two main reasons for this would be the 
under-representation of children in this immigrant group and also the high 
employment rate. While the Irish have an employment rate of 59 percent, the rate for 
the EU12 is 80 percent. This employment rate places the EU12 group above all other 
immigrant groups and by a significant margin. Their unemployment rate, at 6.5 
percent, is above that of the Irish but could well be explained by the presence of 
recent arrivals and hence jobseekers. 
 
In order to get a sense of the educational profile of EU10 immigrants, we need to 
draw on earlier research. Barrett and Duffy (2008) show the education levels of EU10 
immigrants, along with those of other immigrants based on data from 2005. In Table 
5, we present their figures. The first point to be taken from the table is that Ireland’s 
immigrants, in general, are relatively highly educated. We know from Barrett et al 
(2006) that about 30 percent of the Irish labour force have third level qualifications. 
Hence, the proportion of immigrant with third level qualifications, at over 40 percent, 
points to a high-skilled inflow. As regards immigrants from the EU10, although they 
have the lowest proportion of highly educated across the immigrants groups, they still 
compare favourably with the domestic labour force in terms of skill levels. 
 
Although the figures on education levels presented in Table 5 point to a highly skilled 
inflow, research on immigration in Ireland has identified a tendency for immigrants to   7
be employed in situations which do not fully reflect their skills. Of course, this finding 
is typical of migration research in many countries and has given rise to a number of 
theories such as the lack of location-specific human capital and discrimination. Such 
factors may be at play in Ireland but before discussing them, we will look in greater 
detail at the research on labour market outcomes. 
 
The labour market experiences of immigrants in Ireland have been explored along two 
dimensions: wages and occupational attainment. Looking firstly at the work on 
wages, Barrett and McCarthy (2007a) used the Irish component of the European 
Union’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) from 2004 to explore 
the earnings of immigrants generally in Ireland and also those of EU10 immigrants in 
particular. They found that immigrants, on average, earned 18 percent less than 
natives, controlling for characteristics such as gender, experience and education. 
 
However, this aggregate figure of 18 percent hid large differences across immigrant 
groups. For example, when broken down by immigrants from English-speaking and 
non-English-speaking countries they found that the immigrant/native wage difference 
was essentially zero for the former group and 31 percent for the latter group. They 
then went on to look within the non-English-speaking group and found a wage 
disadvantage of 45 percent for EU10 immigrants relative to natives. This was the 
largest disadvantage across the different national groups. 
 
As the data used by Barrett and McCarthy in that paper was collected through 2004, it 
could have been the case that some of the EU10 immigrants in the sample were 
interviewed prior to May 2004. As such, they would have working illegally. Even 
those who have arrived after May would have been very recent arrivals and so the 
high degree of wage disadvantage may not have been a surprise.  
 
In order to get a second look at this issue, Barrett and McCarthy (2007b) repeated the 
analysis using EU-SILC data for 2005. Although the later estimate of the EU10 
immigrant earnings disadvantage was lower at 32 percent, this was still a sizeable 
wage gap and bigger than those of other immigrant groups. Given that the sample was 
drawn in 2005, the wage disadvantage would not have been related to illegality. 
However, the possible lack of location-specific human capital is clear. The EU-SILC   8
data did not include information on year of arrival but we know from the material 
above that most of the EU10 immigrant would have been recent arrivals. 
 
Another view of immigrant earnings, including those of the EU10 immigrants, can be 
found in Barrett et al (2008b). This paper contains significant advances on the two 
Barrett and McCarthy papers, partly because of the data used and partly because of 
the techniques employed. The data used by Barrett et al (2008b) is from a survey of 
50,000 employees taken in 2005, of which 10 percent were immigrants. As Barrett 
and McCarthy were working with samples of around 200 immigrants, Barrett et al 
have a vastly bigger dataset set to work with. And whereas Barrett and McCarthy 
relied on OLS regression, Barrett et al use quantile regression to get a richer sense of 
the immigrant earnings disadvantage across the earnings distribution. 
 
As with Barrett and McCarthy, Barrett et al (2008b) find that immigrants from the 
EU10 have the highest earnings disadvantage across all immigrants groups. The 
figure they report is of an EU10 gap of 18 percent relative to natives. This is smaller 
than the estimates in the two Barrett and McCarthy papers. The more interesting 
results in the paper arise in the context of the quantile regression. The wage gap is 
essentially zero for the first earnings decile but rises steadily across the deciles 
reaching 16 percent in the highest decile. Barrett et al also run OLS wage regressions 
within educational categories to see if the immigrant earnings disadvantage varies 
across educational level. They find that immigrants with low levels of education (i.e. 
primary or secondary only) earn similar amounts relative to natives with similarly low 
levels of education. They also find that the wage gap is evident for those with post-
secondary and tertiary education. They interpret these results as providing evidence 
that the wage disadvantage for EU10 immigrants is not about discrimination of low-
skilled and vulnerable immigrants but about the failure of more skilled immigrants to 
fully capture returns to human capital. 
 
As noted above, the second approach to looking at labour market outcomes was by 
looking at occupational attainment. Barrett and Duffy (2008) use data from Ireland’s 
official labour force survey (known as the Quarterly National Household Survey) 
from 2005 to explore whether immigrants are employed in high-level occupations at 
rates comparable to native employees, controlling for characteristics such as age,   9
experience and gender. They do this by running ordered probit regressions in which 
the dependent variable is a four-way categorisation of occupations, with a ranking 
from high-level to low level. 
 
The first regression presented by Barrett and Duffy show that immigrants (generally) 
are 2 percent less likely to be in the highest level occupations and 4 percent less likely 
to be in the next category down, relative to natives. They are also 2 percent more 
likely to be in the bottom category and 4 percent more likely to be in the category 
second from bottom.  
 
As was the case with the earnings results, the results for immigrants in general hide 
important differences across immigrant groups. And again, as was the case with the 
earnings results, the biggest difference between natives and immigrants arose in the 
case of EU10 immigrants. They were found to be 9 percent more likely to be in the 
lowest occupational category relative to natives and also 9 percent more likely to be in 
the second lowest category. The results also showed them to be 5 percent less likely to 
be in the highest category and 13 percent less likely to be in the second highest group. 
 
We noted under the discussion of earnings that a part of (indeed much of) the 
disadvantage experienced by EU10 immigrants relative to natives may be the result of 
the EU10 immigrants being recent arrivals and so lacking location specific human 
capital. If this were the case, then the disadvantage would not be a concern and would 
be expected to disappear as immigrants spent longer in Ireland and accumulated the 
required location-specific human capital. In the data used by Barrett and Duffy, they 
had information on the year in which immigrants has arrived in Ireland. Hence, they 
were able to explore whether the occupational disadvantage disappeared over time. 
 
The results from the EU10 immigrants, and for most of the other immigrant groups, 
were disappointing. Little evidence was found in support of a decline in the 
“occupational gap” between immigrants and natives, including those from the EU10. 
As Barrett and Duffy write, this could be because the time period being examined was 
too short. It could also have been the case that the cell sizes being used in the analysis 
were too small to generate statistically significant differences in the estimates. But   10
either way, no evidence of labour market integration was found, in the sense in which 
they defined it. 
 
Before leaving this section on the characteristics of the immigrants from the EU10, 
another sources of information should be mentioned. The Central Statistics Office 
(2008) used the Census 2006 to provide profiles of the immigrant communities from 
ten countries, including Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. The profiles are purely 
descriptive, with no regression analyses. However, they do still provide interesting 
insights at the nationality level, something which is missing from the studies just 
referred to due to aggregation of nationalities in the micro-data provided to 
researchers by the CSO. For example, over half of Polish males were working in 
either construction or manufacturing while over half of Polish females were working 
in shops, hotels and restaurants. Among Lithuanians, although 23 percent have a third 
level qualification, only 2 percent were working as professionals. This fits with the 
results in Barrett et al (2006) and Barrett and Duffy (2008).  
 
Yet another interesting finding from this CSO report relates to the extent to which 
married immigrants were not living with their partners. Among Poles, 59 percent of 
married men were not living with their spouses on the night of the Census. Among 
Latvian married men, the corresponding figure was 48 percent. Our interest in this 
figure arises because it is a possible indicator of a mindset among these immigrants 
which sees migration as being temporary. By way of contrast, the proportion of 
married Nigerian immigrants who were not living with their spouses was just 8 
percent.  
 
Section 4: The Impacts of the EU10 Inflow 
 
Research that has been conducted into the labour market impacts of immigration in 
Ireland has not focused on the EU Accession States in particular but has instead taken 
all immigrants as a block. We can, however, make some inferences about the possible 
impacts by drawing on that work.  
 
The impacts of immigration into Ireland have been considered in two papers, Barrett 
et al (2002) and Barrett et al (2006). In the case of both papers, the approach taken   11
was in along the lines of take in Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) in that it involves 
the use of a model of the Irish labour market to simulate the impact of migration and 
to trace through the impact on variables such as GNP, GNP per worker, employment, 
unemployment and wages. A key feature of the model is that it incorporates a crucial 
determinant of output growth in a small open economy such as Ireland, namely, 
competitiveness. In essence, output in Ireland is driven by its ability to attract 
internationally mobile capital and this, in turn, is achieved by having wages that are 
lower relative to trading partners. Migration impacts in the model by constraining 
wage growth through a labour supply increase. This wage dampening effect impacts 
positively on competitiveness and thereby on labour demand.  
 
One problem with using the model to simulate the impact of immigration is that the 
classification of immigrants into the high-skilled and low-skilled categories is not 
clear-cut. In Barrett et al (2002), immigrants who described themselves as having 
particular levels of education were treated as being the same as natives with the 
corresponding levels of education. However, Barrett et al (2006) were dealing with a 
later flow for whom this approach would tend to overstate the true inflow of skills 
given that there was evidence of skilled immigrants working in occupations below 
their skill levels. They approached the problem in one of their simulations by using 
occupations as the indicator of skills as opposed to reported education levels.  
 
In Table 6, we present what can be described as an “inferred” measure of the impact 
of EU12 immigration. We use the term “inferred” because what we have done is to 
take results from Barrett et al (2006) and we have scaled them to fit with the higher 
level of immigration. The figures in Table 6 show the inferred impacts of an inflow of 
180,000 immigrants, with 180,000 being the number of EU12 immigrants in the 
labour force as of 2008.  
 
Barrett et al (2006) present simulation results under two scenarios. In one, adjustment 
within the labour market occurs through the rate of unemployment and in the other 
adjustment is through wages. As the rate of unemployment was generally constant 
around 2004 (at 4.5 percent), it seems reasonable to assume that most of the 
adjustment to immigration was through wages. For this reason, we only present 
results based on that scenario here.    12
 
The first point to be taken from Table 6 relates to the impact on employment. 
Although an inflow 180,000 represents 8 percent of the labour force, the simulation 
suggests that the impact on employment is actually much lower. Employment only 
increases by 4.4 percent. The reason for this is because wages fall (on average) by 7.8 
percent and so there is a reduction in labour supply. Given the net increase in 
employment and a positive impact on output per worker, GNP is increased by close to 
6 percent.  
 
Even through this concise presentation of results from the impact simulation, it is 
possible to get a sense of the mechanism through which EU10/12 immigration 
impacted positively upon the Irish economy. The Irish economy was experiencing 
rapid growth around 2004 and so demand for labour was strong. In the absence of a 
large inflow, wages would have risen. This would have choked off the increased 
labour demand and so employment growth, and hence GNP growth, would have been 
constrained. In a sense, inward migration into Ireland helped to prevent further losses 
in competiveness as the deterioration in Ireland’s competitiveness became a key 
concern in the middle part of this decade. 
 
Section 5: Discussion 
 
The ultimate objective of this chapter has been to explore the labour market impacts 
of EU Accession on the Irish labour market. In order to arrive at an assessment of 
such impacts, it was necessary to move through a number of steps. These steps 
involve determining the number who immigrated and their labour-related 
characteristics, analysing their labour market outcomes and then simulating the 
impacts using a model of the Irish labour market. The conclusions from these steps 
were as follows. 
 
EU Accession occurred at a time when the Irish economy was growing rapidly and 
after a period of almost 10 years of sustained growth. It was against this background 
that the Irish Government chose to allow full access to the Irish labour market for all 
citizens of the EU10. Given the rapidly growing economy and the limited numbers of 
countries who granted such free access as of May 2004, it was perhaps unsurprising   13
that a large inflow into Ireland from the EU10 commenced. The number of EU10 
nationals resident in Ireland grew from under 14,000 in 2002 to over 120,000 in 2006. 
The continued inflows in 2007 and 2008 suggest that the population of EU12 
immigrants in Ireland in 2008 was around 200,000, or around 4.5 percent of the total 
population. 
 
As regards the inflow of EU10 nationals into the Irish labour market, the 
proportionate inflow was much higher. As of 2008, 8 percent of the labour force was 
from the EU12, according to the official labour force survey. However, administrative 
data collected through the issuing of social security numbers suggest a much bigger 
inflow. Between 2002 and 2006, over 300,000 PPS numbers were issued to EU10 
nationals. The discrepancy between the two sources is likely to be the result of very 
short-term stays on the parts of a sizeable proportion of EU10 immigrants. 
 
While the immigrants from the EU10 appear to have levels of education comparable 
to the existing labour force, two strands of research suggest that the EU10 immigrants 
are employed in occupations below what might be expected given their educations. 
The wage gap between immigrants and natives is largest for the EU10 nationals, with 
estimates of the gap ranging between 18 and 45 percent. It is also the case the EU10 
immigrants experience the largest “occupational gap” relative to natives, where this is 
defined as occupational attainment given education levels. Combined, these results 
suggest that the EU10 inflow may have been low-skilled in its impact. 
 
Drawing on previous work that has estimated the impact of immigration into Ireland 
in general, we have attempted to infer the impacts of the EU10 migration. The 
inferred results suggest that the inflow allowed for employment to increase, although 
by an amount substantially below the labour force increase implied by the inflow. The 
modelling exercise suggests that wages would have fallen, thereby diluting the 
employment impact as some natives withdrew from participation. As the rate of 
unemployment remained largely unchanged during the period under question, we 
would tend to believe that the impacts of immigration were felt through lower wages 
and hence these withdrawals from the labour market. However, it should be stressed 
that the model used to establish these results was estimated using time series data   14
from 1966 to 2002. If it were the case that the inward migration altered the workings 
of the Irish labour market, then this could have been missed in the simulations.  
 
The process within the model whereby inward migration dampened wage increases is 
likely to have reflected reality quite well, even if precise estimation of the impacts is 
difficult. As Ireland is a small and open economy, it is generally understood that 
competitiveness is a critical factor in economic growth. From around the beginning of 
this decade Ireland had been losing competitiveness as the prolonged period of 
economic growth resulted in wage increases above those of Ireland’s trading partners. 
In the absence of large labour force inflows, such wage increases would have been 
even greater, thereby choking off labour demand.  
 
Given the downturn in the Irish economy in 2008, the context has now changed 
dramatically. From a growth rate of over 5 percent in 2007, Ireland’s economy will 
contract in 2008. This new situation gives rise to a set of questions including that of 
how the recent inflow will react. To date, the answer to this is unknown but the 
prospect of outward migration on the part of the EU10 nationals brings to mind 
aspects of Ireland’s migration experience of the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Looking firstly at the 1980s, and indeed earlier, Honohan (1984 and 1993) showed 
how migration to and from Ireland tended to react to differentials between the rates of 
unemployment in Ireland and the UK whereby a stable gap between the rates tended 
to hold. In essence, population movements out of Ireland at times of high 
unemployment tended to keep the rate of unemployment lower than it would 
otherwise have been. With unemployment on the increase in Ireland, forecasts for 
2009 see a return to outward migration
3 and hence a rate of unemployment below that 
which would hold in the absence of that outflow (Barrett et al, 2008a).  
 
Turning to Ireland’s experience of migration in the 1990s, many of those who left 
Ireland in the 1980s returned during the upturn of the 1990s. One interesting by-
product of that out-and-return migration experience was an apparent increase in the 
human capital of those who left and returned relative to those who never left (Barrett 
                                                 
3 See Figure 2   15
and O’Connell, 2001). Such an effect could now be part of the labour market impacts 
on the EU10 as return migration occurs. However, the poor labour market situations 
in which many of these immigrants found themselves in Ireland, and in the UK, may 
mean that little human capital will have been accumulated while working away and 
hence may lessen any such effect.    16
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Table 1: Stocks of Irish and non-Irish national in Census 2002 and Census 2006 
 
 2002 2006
Population totals  3858495 4172013
    
Total Irish  3584975 3706683
    
Total non-Irish  224261 419733
Not stated  48412 44279
% Non-Irish (including not 
stated) 
71 1
Non-EU Europe (including 
9,101 people from Russia, 
Romania and Ukraine) 
23105  




Table 2: Inflows by nationality, 2003-2008 (and outflow to EU 12) 
 
 2003  2004 2005 2006 2007  2008
Irish 17.6  16.7 18.5 18.9 20  16.2
UK 9.1  7.4 8.9 9.9 5.9  7
Rest of EU 15  8.8  13.3 9.3 12.7 10.4  8.6
EU 12      34.1 49.9 52.7  33.7
USA   2.1  2.3 2.1 1.7 2.8  2
Rest of world  22.4  18.8 11.6 14.7 17.8  16.3
Total 60  58.5 84.5 107.8 109.6  83.8
            




   0.8 2.3 7  9
 
   19
Table 3: Number of PPS numbers issued to EU10 nationals 2002-2006, along with % 
where no employment activity is registered and % with employment activity in each 
year 
 




% with employment activity by year 
2002 8975  0.14 0.75 0.69 0.59 0.55  0.51
2003 8967  0.12 0.06 0.73 0.73 0.62  0.57
2004 58079  0.10 0.00 0.01 0.79 0.75  0.65
2005 107451  0.18 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.71 0.69




Table 4: Labour Force Statistics on Ireland’s Immigrants (aged 15 and over), 2008 
 
Table 5: Educational Distributions of Immigrants by National Group, 2005 
 
 UK  EU-
13 
EU10 Other  USA  All 
immigrants 
 %% % % %   %
No formal/ primary 
education 
2.4 1.1 6.4 4.7 0.0 4.0
Lower secondary  18.3 2.2 9.3 3.5 7.1  8.4
Upper secondary  19.6 22.4 37.8 25.2 17.9  26.8
Post Leaving  11.4 8.2 14.6 7.1 10.7  10.4
Third level  15.1 14.2 12.6 13.6 3.6  13.6
Third level - degree or 
above 
33.3 51.9 19.2 45.9 60.7 36.8
 100 100 100 100 100  100
            
N 378 268 452 508 28  1634
 
 Employed  Unemployed  UE  rate 
(%) 
Inactive Total  Employment 
rate (%) 
Irish 1770.7  90.7 0.049 1164.7 3026.1  0.59
UK 54.5 4.2 0.072 41 99.7  0.55
EU15 31.2  1.8 0.055 10.2 43.2 0.72
EU12 167.2  11.6 0.065 29.3 208.1  0.80
Other 84.8  7.2 0.078 41 133 0.64
Total 2108.4  115.5 0.052 1286.2 3510.1  0.60  20
Table 6: Inferred Impact of EU10 immigration of 180,000 labour force participants 
 
 %  change 
GNP per worker  1.7
GNP  5.9
Total employment  4.4
Average wage  -7.8
 